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INTERBASIN TRANSFER IN A RIPARIAN JURISDICTION
ROBERT HASKELL ABRAMS*
Lack of water in the United States traditionally is viewed as a
problem of the western states. In the more humid East, where an-
nual rainfall consistently exceeds thirty inches,1 acute water
shortages are uncommon. Accordingly, eastern states seldom have
considered or implemented large scale water diversions to augment
water supplies. The major exceptions involve water importation to
supply metropolitan areas, most notably New York and Boston.2
Additional impetus to augment supply has resulted from extraordi-
nary climatic conditions and has generated substantial contro-
versy. For example, the 1980 drought in Virginia$ precipitated a
political battle between the cities of Norfolk and Suffolk over
groundwater.4 Both cities wished to tap deep aquifers underlying
land in Suffolk. Fearing long-term adverse consequences of pump-
ing by Norfolk, Suffolk tried to prevent Norfolk from obtaining a
permit for its Suffolk well site.5 Lawsuits and a political donny-
brook ensued. This effort at preventing ground water exportation6
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Michigan. A.B., 1969, J.D., 1973, University of Michigan. The author would like to thank
John Lawson and Bob McAllister for their research assistance in preparing this Article.
1. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 3 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as NWC].
2. New York City imports water from the Delaware River; Boston imports water from the
Connecticut River. Both of these out-of-basin diversions have been the subject of litigation.
See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (Delaware River); Connecticut v. Massa-
chusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) (Connecticut River).
3. See M. HREzo, NORFOLK V. SUFFOLK: PROPOSED AGREEMENT LEAVES IMPORTANT ISSUES
UNSEmTLED (Va. Water Resources Research Center, Special Report No. 14, Nov. 1981).
[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT]. Ms. Hrezo describes the severity of the 1980 drought
by noting that rainfall was 40% below normal in most of eastern Virginia.
4. See Richmond Times Dispatch, Oct. 21, 1980, at B-1, col. 1.
5. See Richmond Times Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1980, at B-1, col. 4. The Suffolk City Council
denied drilling permits to Norfolk while approving drilling permits sought by its own public
utility department.
6. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. Suffolk did not intend to conserve the resource;
Suffolk sought permits to construct and pump deep wells in the same aquifer "with the aim
of selling the water to Norfolk and other localities as the need arose." Id. This en-
trepreneurial spirit may be the best course of action for water exporting areas to pursue. See
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is reminiscent of western water wars.' More recently, the neighbor-
ing city of Virginia Beach proposed a number of possible in-
terbasin transfers of surface water to alleviate its chronic water
shortages.'
Even in non-drought situations, expansion of water supplies is
becoming a more pressing issue in the East due to several factors,
of which the foremost is increased demand for water. Nationwide
projections for 1985 indicate a thirteen percent increase in con-
sumptive water use over 1975 levels.9 By the year 2000, anticipated
water use will be twenty-seven percent greater than in 1975.10 The
causes of this increasing demand include increased population, ex-
panded water use for industrial purposes, and increased crop irri-
gation in all regions of the nation.11 In the East, adequate supplies
exist to meet this demand, though local redistribution of water un-
doubtedly will be necessary.12 As these subregional shortages ne-
cessitate redistribution to expand local supply, interbasin diversion
of water will be among the alternatives considered."
Diversions of water in the West, where legal doctrines facilitate
diversion, 4 are the subject of considerable study.1 5 In contrast,
infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
8. See Newport News Daily Press, Aug. 19, 1982, at A-27, col. 4.
9. See UNTrED STATES WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, 1 THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES
1975-2000, at 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NWC PROJECTIONS]. These figures are some-
what more conservative than the estimate of the National Water Commission made only six
years earlier. The earlier study projected that consumptive use in the year 2000 would be
23% higher than the 1980 figure and that the growth pattern would continue unabated for
another 20 years. The use in 2020 was expected to be 50% greater than the 1980 level. See
NWC, supra note 1, at 11.
10. See NWC PROJECTIONS, supra note 9, at 5, 29.
11. Id. at 29-41. The industrial use of water includes cooling electric generation facilities.
Vast quantities of water are required for this use, but almost all of it is returned to the
source from which it is withdrawn. Id. at 38. In contrast, irrigation withdrawals are far
smaller, but consume much more water. Id. at 36.
12. See, e.g., statement of Professor Leonard Shabman, a member of the Virginia Water
Study Commission: '"Even within regions of Virginia there's plenty of water .... The con-
troversy is how we share the plenty, not how we divide up the scarcity." Newport News
Daily Press, Aug. 19, 1982, at 27, col. 4.
13. Id.
14. The prevailing legal doctrine in the West is prior appropriation, which gives quanti-
fied priorities to water users. The requirement that water remain in the basin of origin was
dropped at an early date. The most prominent example of this development is Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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considerable uncertainty surrounds the prospect of diversions in
the East. This Article explores some issues pertaining to interbasin
diversion of water in the East. The major issues surveyed are the
physical and political aspects of interbasin transfers and the legal
doctrines that govern them. Intrastate transfers are studied sepa-
rately from interstate transfers to delineate unique problems that
attend the latter. When possible, the Article will focus on Virginia
as a state that has importing regions where interbasin transfer is a
possibility. 16
THE PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERBASIN WATER
TRANSFERS
Useable Supply of Water
In general, useable water comes only from streamflow and acces-
sible ground water. These waters serve a myriad of human pur-
poses including domestic use, irrigation, manufacturing, and cool-
ing. Water used for these purposes is measured in one of two ways:
by measuring the amount of water withdrawn or by measuring the
amount of water consumed. Consumptive use, as the name implies,
consumes the tater as part of the activity. Withdrawals far exceed
consumption because most forms of water use return the bulk of
the water to the streams from which the water was taken.17 Once
returned to the stream, water may be withdrawn again, and either
consumed or returned to the stream.
The largest consumptive use of water in the United States is irri-
gation of crops.18 Cooling of electric generation facilities, although
consuming a very small percentage of the water withdrawn for that
purpose, is the next largest consumptive use. This results from the
vast quantity of water used for this purpose. 9 Another major con-
sumptive user is industry, although different processes require dif-
ferent amounts of water.
Sound planning and policy require that limits be set on the
15. See, e.g., NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, LAw OF INTERBASIN TRANsFERs (1971) (R.
Johnson).
16. The Article examines both intrastate and interstate importation.
17. See generally NWC, supra note 1, at 30-31.
18. See NWC PROJECTIONS, supra note 9, at 28-29.
19. Id. at 28.
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
amount of water withdrawn or consumed in a region because main-
taining ground water at a particular level and maintaining a sub-
stantial portion of natural streamflow serve many critical func-
tions. In eastern Virginia, for example, streamflow prevents
saltwater intrusion into upstream areas. Streamflow flushes sensi-
tive estuarine areas and prevents them from becoming excessively
saline, thereby maintaining their productivity. It also supports vi-
tal in-stream uses including power generation, fishing, navigation,
and recreation, and is essential to other, less apparent human
water uses such as waste disposal, where the assimilative capacity
of a stream depends on its flow. Similar considerations caution
against limitless ground water pumping: water supply rationally
cannot be expanded by bleeding dry local streams and indiscrimi-
nately pumping available ground water.2 0
Increasing Supply-The Options and Their Constituencies
When local water resources appear to be insufficient to meet lo-
cal demand, the search for increased supply begins. Government
typically plays an important role in the search by seeking alternate
water sources, 21 by creating a quasi-utility that attempts to in-
crease supply,22 or by passing laws that facilitate interbasin trans-
fer.2 s The means of alleviating water shortages are limited, and the
20. Substantially increased ground water prmping may interfere with existing wells by
lowering the water table. Surface subsidence can occur under certain subsurface conditions.
Finally, surface flows in some areas are linked to ground water, and large-scale pumping can
affect surface flow in streams or damage associated wetlands by depriving them of water.
See generally D. MILLER, WATER AT THE SURFACE OF THE EARTH 414-16, 426 (1977).
21. In the West, for example, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation built many of the irriga-
tion projects and then transferred management responsibilities to locally formed irrigation
districts.
22. See, e.g., J. Sayre, A Case Study of the Windy Gap Project (June 9, 1982) (paper
delivered to Conference on New Sources of Water for Energy Development and Growth:
Interbasin Transfers, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law)
[hereinafter cited as Windy Gap Materials].
23. These laws include granting power to condemn lands over which diverted water must
pass, granting utility status to companies that build or operate water projects, and attempt-
ing to increase the transferability of the water rights. See generally WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS §§ 300-307, 620.1-620.5 (R. Clark ed. 1970).
In 1982 the Interbasin Transfer Act, House Bill 502, was introduced to the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly but was withdrawn pending further study. The bill would have required a
permit from the State Water Control Board to commence interbasin diversions of more than
500,000 gallons per day. The permit, issued after a full public hearing, would not have pre-
[Vol. 24:591
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response to each is predictable. One obvious alternative source, sea
water desalinization, is prohibitively expensive.24 Locating and tap-
ping new ground water aquifers is an uncertain endeavor that can-
not be relied upon to provide large supplemental water reserves.25
Conservation measures may save significant amounts of water,"
but are difficult to implement because conservation usually re-
quires concerted efforts by many individuals. Despite a number of
obstacles, transferring additional water into the basin, which in-
volves moving water via pipelines or canals from one watershed to
another, is often the most attractive option.27
Interbasin diversion, even when well-conceived and executed, is
expensive and degrading to the environment. 28 Additionally, imple-
menting interbasin transfers is politically complex. Despite these
drawbacks, interbasin transfer possesses a number of advantages
as a solution to water shortage problems. Interbasin transfer in-
creases supply without palpable losses to any group of individuals.
The "losers" are located in a watershed selected as the area of ori-
gin precisely because that area has a current water surplus. The
transfer promotes efficient water use by preventing the "loss" of
water which would otherwise flow into the ocean "unused. ' 29 Pro-
empted local ordinances. REPORT OF THE STATE WATER STUDY COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR
AND GENERAL. ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, Senate Document 24 (1982).
24. See U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF WATER RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY ANNUAL
REIORT-1979, at 79-82; Botha, Desalination: A Practical Process, 4 I.M.E.S.A. (Johannes-
burg) 43, 45, 47 (1979).
25. Drilling for water in some areas of the nation may not be successful due to non-uni-
form subsurface strata. In areas having large, easily tapped aquifers, major new pumping
efforts by one user may affect the water table level and interfere with pumping by others
already using the same ground water source. Finally, massive pumping efforts simply may
fail because of a lack of reserves or an inability to tap them adequately. See supra note 20
and accompanying text. See generally 4 NWC PROJECTIONS, supra note 9, New England
Region at 17, 19; Mid-Atlantic Region at 18; Ohio Region at 13, 16; Missouri Region at 13;
Rio Grande Region at 16-17; Pacific Northwest Region at 17-18; California Region at 21-22.
26. See 1 NWC PROJECTIONS, supra note 9, at 21.
27. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
28. For a thorough discussion of the legal and practical implications of water transfer and
diversion, see Comment, The Legal Aspects of Appropriative Water Rights Transfers in
California, 11 U.C.D. L. REV. 441, 451-54 (1978).
29. The concept of unused water is inherently ambiguous. All water not diverted and
consumed can be viewed as "unused." Realistically, water left in the stream is also used for
important purposes such as maintaining sufficient streamflow for navigation, fishing, and
the like. Sound water planning should recognize these uses.
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ponents of interbasin transfer also may justify it by identifying
benefits that occur in places other than the importing region. For
example, if a dam is needed to store water for the transfer,30 pro-
ject proponents could include recreation afforded by a dam's reser-
voir among the project's benefits. Furthermore, if the dam can be
used as a means to generate electricity, this too, will be counted as
a benefit.
Residents of the area of origin do not always oppose transfers.
To the extent that the water exceeds both current and foreseeable
future needs, the project is not a threat to the area of origin. More-
over, benefits often will accrue to the region, including increased
employment in the construction phase and economic growth ac-
companying collateral benefits such as recreation. 1
Losses that do occur as a result of interbasin transfers 32 are pri-
marily environmental. Formerly free-flowing streams may lose
their ability to support some types of sport fishing. If the transfer
requires a reservoir, the reservoir waters will inundate a valley,
thus prohibiting activities such as farming and forestry. Sedimen-
tation behind the reservoir's dam may result in accumulation of
toxins. The transfer itself will require either a substantial pipeline
or a canal, with the attendant environmental costs concentrated in
what is usually a relatively unspoiled area. The energy required to
raise the water out of the basin of origin may be substantial, espe-
cially if the lift is great or the quantities large.3 Nonetheless, if
demand for water in the importing area substantially exceeds sup-
ply, the benefits of transfer may outweigh the costs. 4
30. Often such a dam is required to provide for an intake capable of transferring substan-
tial quantities of water. Similarly, augmenting supply may be a seasonal concern. The reser-
voir created by a dam may be useful in allowing maximum flexibility in timing the
diversion.
31. If the project requires building a reservoir, the likely location will be the less-devel-
oped exporting region. See Plater, Reflected In a River: Agency Accountability and the
TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REv. 747, 754-55 (1982).
32. For an excellent discussion of the adverse environmental consequences of dam con-
struction, see National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1297-1303
(D.D.C. 1982).
33. See, e.g., J. Bulkley, S. Wright & D. Wright, Preliminary Diversion Study From Lake
Superior to Missouri River Basin 9-10 (1982) (unpublished manuscript, a copy of which is
on file with the author).
34. The Windy Gap Project, designed to bring water over the transcontinental divide
onto the Eastern Slope of the Rockies near Denver, anticipates user costs of $1,000 per acre-
596 [Vol. 24:591
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On a pragmatic level, the area of origin is ill-equipped to prevent
an interbasin transfer because the choice to proceed with an in-
terbasin diversion usually is a political decision. 5 Assuming the
proposed transfer is wholly intrastate, the importing region almost
invariably enjoys more political power than the area of origin. The
same factors of population density and economic development that
generate demand for increased water supply translate into political
advantages arising from a system of proportional representation
and from the ability of well-focused economic interests to make
themselves heard.36 If an interbasin transfer receives support from
the area of origin as well as the area of importation, the only plau-
sible constraints are expense and opposition due to environmental
consequences of the project. Experience indicates, however, that
these forces do not always prevent construction, at least in the long
term.37 If western experience is any guide, federal subsidy is likely
to alleviate the expense problem.38
Interstate interbasin transfers are politically more complex than
intrastate transfers. No longer is the political decision solely in the
hands of a legislature whose constituency is likely to see the trans-
fer as either wholly good (substantial benefits to both regions) or
foot of water. One of a handful of projects based on a user-pay concept, the viability of the
project is due to the tremendous demand for water on the Eastern Slope. See generally
Windy Gap Materials, supra note 22.
35. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
36. See generally S. Williams, Prior Appropriation Doctrine as a Cause of Premature
Water Development (June 7, 1982) (paper delivered to Conference on New Sources of Water
for Energy Development and Growth: Interbasin Transfers, Natural Resources Law Center,
University of Colorado School of Law) (citing reasons that explain disproportionate power
of importing regions in water diversion conflicts). Sometimes, however, the area-of-origin
prevails. See, e.g., Newport News Daily Press, Aug. 19, 1982, at 27, col. 4 (remarks of Sena-
tor Mitchell in the Virginia General Assembly on the withdrawal of a diversion bill).
37. Cf. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVmONMENI: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTON (1971) (ad-
vancing the view that monied interests are persistent advocates of projects not easily rebuf-
fed by a single defeat). See also Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency Accountability and the
TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REv. 747, 749, 753, 760-64 (1982) (chronicling the saga
of the Tellico Dam which, although it was economically unsound, ecologically unsound, and
highly visible in the political process, was nevertheless built due to the concerted efforts of a
few individuals).
38. Many major water projects are heavily subsidized by the federal government. Fre-
quently, the subsidy will be in the form of a long-term construction loan bearing an ex-
tremely low interest rate. See, e.g., Brownstein & Easton, Bailing Out the West, 3 THE
AMicus JouRNAL 6 (1982).
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at least good on balance (some lesser detriment to the area of ori-
gin).89 Instead, if few or no benefits accrue to the exporting area,
opposition to the transfer is likely to be raised by the state of ori-
gin acting through its legislative or executive branches. The inter-
state nature of the transfer also portends a role for the federal gov-
ernment. Should it enter the fray, the federal government's
position cannot be predicted by the relatively simple calculus that
was assumed to exist within a single state.40 The interstate context
is also more complicated because the legal system imposes on the
parties constraints that generally are absent in the intrastate
arena.4 1 The remainder of this Article focuses on the legal aspects
of interbasin transfers, beginning with intrastate transfers in a ri-
parian jurisdiction such as Virginia, then culminating with an ex-
amination of the problems attending an interstate transfer.
INTRASTATE INTERBASIN DIVERSION
In the early 1970's, the National Water Commission prepared a
series of studies of the key aspects of water policy. One of these
studies concerned transfers of water rights.42 The study identified
as a major impediment to such transfers state laws that make
water rights appurtenant to the land. Thus, inquiry must focus
on the extent to which state laws in the East bind water rights to
riparian land and impede all transfers of water, especially in-
terbasin transfers. Rather than speaking in general terms about
state laws and canvassing the entire East, Virginia is chosen as an
example of a state in which water rights are appurtenant to land.
Thus, Virginia water law will be examined to determine whether
interbasin diversions may occur in a riparian jurisdiction.
Common Law Riparianism and Interbasin Transfers
An individual enjoys status as a riparian owner by virtue of own-
39. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
42. NATIONAL WATER COMISSION, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IM-
PROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES (1971) (C. Meyers & R. Posner).
43. Id. at 25.
[Vol. 24:591t
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ing land that abuts a water body." In the eastern United States, a
riparian owner's rights to the water on which he owns land are gov-
erned by the doctrine of reasonable use.45 Reasonable use usually
allows use of the entire flow or the entire water surface, so long as
the correlative rights of co-riparians are not infringed.4
Interbasin transfers of water are not assimilated easily into a
system of riparian rights based on reasonable use because the piv-
otal legal issue is usually whether diversion of the water for use on
a nonriparian tract is a reasonable riparian use. A number of ap-
proaches for determining the reasonableness of a use exists ranging
from a per se rule deeming unreasonable any use for the benefit of
nonriparian land, to an ad hoc determination of whether the use is
reasonable under the particular facts of the case.47 Regardless of
the state's approach, out-of-basin diversion of water is unlikely to
qualify as reasonable because the water does not return to the orig-
inal watercourse for subsequent use by riparians.4 s
Little Virginia case law exists exploring the question whether in-
terbasin diversion of water qualifies as a reasonable rilparian use of
water. The absence of case law reflects, in part, the underlying his-
torical reality that few occasions have arisen where water needs
were pressing enough to require augmentation of local water sup-
44. Technically, riparianism refers to ownership of land along a river or stream. Landown-
ers along lakes enjoy littoral rights. The bodies of law regarding riparian rights and littoral
rights are virtually identical; therefore, riparianism tends to be employed as the generic
term.
45. Whether the use is reasonable depends on the facts of each case. Reasonable uses
might include irrigation, flotage, power generation, and cleansing. See G. WARVE L, PINCI-
PLES OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 49 (1909). See also Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala.
127 (1856) (water cattle); Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (1903) (supplying water for
900 asylum residents); Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N.J. Eq. 65, 33 A. 286 (1895)
(mining); Bullard v. Saratoga Victory Mfg. Co., 77 N.Y. 525 (1879) (running a mill); Kaler v.
Campbell, 13 Or. 596, 11 P. 301 (1885) (culinary and other domestic purposes).
46. There are minor exceptions to the general rule. For example, the entire flow of the
stream may be exhausted for domestic use without reference to the impact on co-riparians.
47. See generally Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979).
48. For any type of water use, for example irrigation, it is possible to construct a calculus
of the likelihood that a particular instance of that type of use will be found to be reasonable.
Likelihood of being found reasonable is greatest when the use occurs on a riparian parcel
itself. Likelihood of being found unreasonable is greatest when the situs of use is not only
nonriparian, but located in another watershed. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys'
School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
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plies. The cases that do exist, although apparently opposed to in-
terbasin diversion, do not fully dispose of the issue.49 Further, the
cases are more than thirty years old and thus invite judicial reex-
amination to consider if changed conditions now make interbasin
transfer a reasonable use of water.
The Supreme Court of Virginia decision most closely on point is
Town of Purcellville v. Potts.5° The town of Purceilville, an up-
stream riparian on the two tributaries of a stream that flowed
through Potts' land, erected dams on those streams and diverted
the water from its natural channel into a reservoir. Thereafter the
water was piped into the town for use. As a result, Potts was una-
ble to use the stream for watering livestock, as had been his cus-
tom for many years. Potts thus sought an injunction to remove the
dams from the streams. The court ordered the town to remove the
dams, but stayed the order for a short time to allow the town to
institute condemnation proceedings to acquire Potts' water
rights. 1
The language of the opinion in Purcellville is strong and appears
to announce a per se rule forbidding interbasin diversion:
While a riparian owner is entitled to a reasonable use of the
water, he has no right to divert it for use beyond his riparian
land, and any such diversion and use is an infringement on the
rights of the lower riparian proprietors who are thereby deprived
of the flow. Such a diversion is an extraordinary and not a rea-
sonable use.52
The opinion does not specify whether the town's diversion carried
the water out of the watershed. The rule articulated by the court,
however, is extremely stringent because it forbids diversion of
water for use on any tract other than the riparian tract itself.5 3
In tracing the origin of the per se rule in Purcellville, the court
49. See Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942); Gordonsville v.
Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921).
50. 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942).
51. Id. at 525, 19 S.E.2d at 704.
52. Id. at 521, 19 S.E.2d at 703.
53. It is possible, albeit unlikely, that all benefitted parcels were riparian to the stream.
This would be true only if all those served by the town water system were themselves ripari-
ans. Even so, Potts would be damaged as a result of the bypass of his property.
[Vol. 24:591
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relied on a well-known property treatise" and an early Virginia
case that likened diversion of waters to a private nuisance.5 5 Exam-
ination of these sources tempers the court's inflexible language.
The treatise does not state a general rule about diversion of water,
but addresses the rights of two riparians with respect to each
other. Although both enjoy an equal right to reasonable use of the
water, the lower riparian is to receive the water "without material
diminution" of flow.5 The right to enjoin the upper riparian's di-
version, however, is contingent upon the lower riparian suffering
"prejudice. ' 57 Prejudice is equivalent to actual harm and is an ele-
ment of the lower riparian's cause of action in tort. The upper ri-
parian's use, even if it diverted the entire stream, would not be
enjoined in the absence of injury to the complaining riparian.58
Similarly, the earlier Virginia case which deemed diversion a pri-
vate nuisance 9 implicitly required that the complaining riparian
suffer actual injury caused by invasion of his rights. A private nui-
sance will be enjoined only if interference with plaintiff's use and
enjoyment of his land is unreasonable and substantial."0 On its
facts, then, Purcellville is properly decided. Potts suffered actual
injury due to the reduced flow of the stream. As a precedent gov-
erning interbasin diversion of water, however, Purcellville should
be read only as affirming the propriety of enjoining unreasonable
uses causing actual injury. If water diverted to another basin is
truly surplus in its area of origin, then Purcellville should not ap-
ply because no actual injury will result to riparians in the area of
origin. Thus, in any Virginia intrastate interbasin diversion, availa-
bility of an injunction will turn on the reasonableness of the use,
which will be a factual inquiry into whether riparians in the basin
54. R. MINOR, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 55 (2d ed. 1928) (cited with approval in 179 Va.
at 520-21, 19 S.E.2d at 702-03).
55. See 179 Va. at 522, 19 S.E.2d at 703 (discussing Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E.
329 (1892)).
56. R. MINOR, supra note 76, § 55 (quoted in 179 Va. at 520-21, 19 S.E.2d at 702-03).
57. Id.
58. See Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921) (to prevail in an action for
damages or injunctive relief the complaining riparian owner must show some substantial
actual damage). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) TORTS §§ 850, 850A (1979).
59. Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 553, 14 S.E. 329, 330 (1892) (quoted in 179 Va. at 522,
19 S.E.2d at 703).
60. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 88 (4th ed. 1971).
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of origin suffer actual harm."1
The Virginia Constitution and the Power of the General
Assembly
To date, Virginia has no general legislation that precisely gov-
erns interbasin diversion.2 A variety of laws, however, address the
regulation of the state's waters.6 3 Foremost among these is the
State Water Control Law,6 4 enacted to fulfill the state's role in
controlling water pollution under the federal Clean Water Act. 5
The Virginia Code also contains a series of provisions that estab-
lish state policy for water resources;6 however, these policy stat-
utes do not address directly the issue of interbasin transfers.
The relevant provisions of the water policy laws announce that
the state government may "effectuate the proper and comprehen-
sive utilization" of "waters for all purposes beneficial to the pub-
lic."6 7 Additionally, the government may determine that the
"changing wants and needs of the people of the State may require
the water. . . to be put to uses beneficial to the public."6 " Finally,
these laws note that public welfare entails "the proper develop-
ment" of natural resources. e Despite related statutory language
that guarantees vested rights of water use7 0 and local governmental
prerogatives,7 1 the policy announced is not hostile to interbasin di-
61. The other major Virginia cases are not directly on point. In Hite v. Town of Luray,
175 Va. 218, 8 S.E.2d 369 (1940), the issue was defining water rights among a group of takers
from a single grantor. In Davis v. Town of Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864, 83 S.E. 401 (1914), the
decision involved the reasonableness of an electric generation plant detaining water and
thereby forcing the lower riparian to run his mill only when the generation plant was in
operation.
62. Such a bill was introduced but withdrawn in the 1982 General Assembly. See supra
note 23.
63. See generally VA. CODE tit. 62.1 (1982).
64. See VA. CODE § 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:7 (1982).
65. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1376 (1976).
66. VA. CODE § 62.1-10 to -13 (1982) (discussed in Walker & Cox, Virginia Water Policy:
The Imprecise Mandate, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 312, 314-15 (1972).
67. VA. CODE § 62.1-11(b) (1982).
68. Id. § 62.1-11(c).
69. Id. § 62.1-11(d).
70. Id. § 62.1-12.
71. Id. § 62.1-13.
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version. Such diversions easily could be viewed as "comprehen-
sive utilization" of the diverted waters in response to the "chang-
ing wants of the public" reflected in increased demand for water in
the importing basin. In that light, an interbasin transfer is a
"proper development" for a purpose that is beneficial to the pub-
lic. Existing statutory water policy, therefore, arguably permits in-
terbasin transfers of water, even in cases lacking express legislative
approval of the proposed transfer. The common law of riparianism
would control the legal fate of such a project.7 3
In contrast to the constitutions of many western states, 4 the
Virginia Constitution addresses water resources in general policy
terms leaving the Virginia General Assembly free to adopt laws to
control water use. The pertinent provisions of the Virginia Consti-
tution are sections 1, 2, and 3 of article XI.75 They declare resource
72. But see Walker & Cox, supra note 66, at 315. Language in existing statutes protective
of vested rights cannot prevent diversions. That language and the due process guarantee of
the fourteenth amendment, however, provide a check on government action regarding
vested property rights. Compensation must be paid if vested rights are destroyed by state
action. State law affects the determination of whether the rights are vested. Existing uses of
water that are reasonable are likely to enjoy the legal protection afforded to vested rights.
73. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1-3.
75. The text of these provisions states:
§ 1. Natural, resources and historical sites of the Commonwealth.-To the
end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and enjoyment for
recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources, it
shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its
natural resources, its public lands, and its historical sites and buildings. Fur-
ther, it shall be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands,
and waters from pollution, impairment or destruction, for the benefit, enjoy-
ment, and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.
§ 2. Conservation and development of natural resources and historical
sites.-In the furtherance of such policy, the General Assembly may undertake
the conservation, development, or utilization of lands or natural resources of
the Commonwealth, the acquisition and protection of historical sites and
buildings, and the protection of its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollu-
tion, impairment, or destruction, by agencies of the Commonwealth or by the
creation of public authorities, or by leases or other contracts with agencies of
the United States, with other states, with units of government in the Common-
wealth, or with private persons or corporations. Notwithstanding the time limi-
tations of the provisions of Article X, Section 7, of this Constitution, the Com-
monwealth may participate for any period of years in the cost of projects which
shall be the subject of a joint undertaking between the Commonwealth and
any agency of the United States or of other states.
§ 3. Natural oyster beds.-The natural oyster beds, rocks, and shoals in the
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conservation, including water resources, to be the policy of the
Commonwealth, and recognize the General Assembly as the vehicle
through which the policy is to be implemented. Although commen-
tators on Virginia water policy have suggested that the Virginia
Constitution has "not had appreciable influence on the water re-
source activities of the Commonwealth,"76 the constitution does
provide a foundation for legal analysis of interbasin transfers.
The constitutional provisions confirm the General Assembly's
very broad powers to structure water laws of the Commonwealth to
allow or prevent transfers. For example, the predecessor provision
of section 3 of article XI7 has been construed to give the General
Assembly resource management powers limited only by federal law
and the express Virginia constitutional prohibition on the sale and
lease of the state's oyster beds.78 Accordingly, the General Assem-
bly was allowed to authorize a municipality to dump raw sewage,
even though the dumping would cause severe water pollution ren-
dering the underlying oyster beds unfit for use.7 9 Indeed, the con-
cept of legislative supremacy is so deeply rooted in Virginia law
that the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that "[t]he state
Constitution is not a grant of power, and the Legislature may exer-
cise any and every legislative power of the state not forbidden by
the state Constitution.""
The legal implications of broad legislative power affect directly
interbasin transfers of water. The Virginia Legislature could, if it
chose to do so, expressly authorize diverting water from its natural
course. Further, neither protracted legislative silence nor unfavora-
waters of the Commonwealth shall not be leased, rented, or sold but shall be
held in trust for the benefit of the people of the Commonwealth, subject to
such regulations and restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe, but
the General Assembly may, from time to time, define and determine such nat-
ural beds, rocks, or shoals by surveys or otherwise.
VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-3.
76. Walker & Cox, supra note 66, at 313.
77. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. XIII, § 175. The only change in this section when it was
incorporated into the new constitution as art. XI, § 3, was the substitution of the word
"Commonwealth" for the word "State."
78. See Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 543-44, 164 S.E. 689, 699
(1932).
79. Id.
80. James River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461,
469-70, 122 S.E. 344, 346 (1924).
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ble common law development prohibits the current legislature
from enacting laws that favor transfers."1 Until an express legisla-
tive scheme governing interbasin transfers is enacted, however, the
common law in Virginia will control this issue."2
The Potential Role of the Virginia General Assembly
The previous two subsections demonstrate that Virginia law
probably permits intrastate interbasin diversion of water if the
transfer does not injure riparians in the basin of origin. The previ-
ous discussion also indicates the General Assembly has extensive
power over water resources.83 Considering what types of legislation
might be enacted to prevent or to facilitate transfers will be
instructive.
One simple response would be to prohibit interbasin transfers
legislatively. Invoking the broad powers over water resources con-
ferred by the Virginia Constitution,8 ' the General Assembly could
81. The General Assembly, if it decided to change present law, might be forced to com-
pensate some adversely affected riparians if the detrimental impact of the change on their
property was so substantial as to be a taking of that property. Very few cases of compensa-
ble takings of property are likely to arise. The reasons supporting this conclusion include
the current status of takings law, the nature of the riparian right allegedly taken, and the
likelihood that interbasin transfers will seldom displace existing water users.
Under the Federal Constitution, the leading case of particular relevance is Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn Central opinion finds no
taking when New York City's historic landmark preservation law prevented development of
a 55 story office building atop Grand Central Station. The Court's finding relied on the fact
that the landowner remained seized of the bulk of the "bundle of sticks" that make up a
property right. Also important was the fact that valuable existing uses of the parcel re-
mained and the grant of transferrable development rights tended to further mitigate any
loss sustained.
An interbasin transfer that adversely affects riparians in the basin of origin does not wipe
out their entire "bundle" of property rights. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
Fastland uses of the riparian tracts will be wholly unimpeded, thereby leaving the bulk of
the riparian's "bundle of sticks" intact. The right that is affected, the right of reasonable
use of the watercourse, may be impaired, but seldom obliterated. The riparian did not enjoy
absolute dominion over the water, only a right to use the water in a way that did not dispro-
portionately disadvantage other co-riparians. Further, most transfers will leave some
streamflow in the basin of origin. Finally, the process of selection of water for transfer will
be sensitive to existing uses of the water. Restated, areas in which there is not surplus water
are not likely candidates for exportation.
82. See supra note 23. For a discussion of the common law in Virginia, see supra notes
44-61 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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decree that such transfers are against public policy and may be
enjoined by the judiciary, or that diversion of water out of its basin
of origin is a per se unreasonable use of water. Although little
doubt exists as to the authority to undertake this action, little in
logic commends it. The potential utility of interbasin transfers
merits a legal framework that allows case-by-case consideration of
each proposal.
Legislative facilitation of interbasin transfers requires more
thoughtful analysis than does an absolute prohibition. The current
impediment to transfers is possible injury to riparians in the basin
of origin. 5 These riparians, if suffering actual injury, might veto
the diversion project because they have the right to obtain an in-
junction."6 This right may be diluted by the General Assembly de-
claring that interbasin diversion of water is a reasonable riparian
use.8 7 Without restructuring common law riparianism, such legisla-
tion would require courts to treat interbasin diversion as an ordi-
nary riparian use subject to judicial balancing of its reasonableness
in light of other uses. Moreover, the legislation could in some cases
protect downstream riparians to a greater extent than does existing
common law, because under existing precedents, upstream uses
may be permitted despite frustration of previously established uses
of downstream riparians.8
Some diversions have occurred in Virginia despite requests for
injunctions by injured lower riparians because the diverting party
condemned the lower riparian's rights.89 These compensible prop-
erty interests, nevertheless, may pose an obstacle to interbasin
transfers. One unlikely possibility is that an interbasin transfer
project might be undertaken by an entrepreneur lacking the power
of condemnation. Another possibility is that condemnation of
these rights for the benefit of private users in the importing basin
85. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., MODEL WATER USE AcT (1958). The Model Act, in § 102(a), defines benefi-
cial use in a way that impliedly permits diversion and interbasin transfer of water. Under
the Model Act, a commission empowered to "obtain the most beneficial use of the water"
manages water using various means, including alteration of stream flows. Id. § 207.
88. See Davis v. Town of Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864, 83 S.E. 401 (1914) (power plant
detained stream flow and rendered plaintiff's mill inoperable except when power plant was
in operation).
89. See, e.g., Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942).
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might not be viewed as a public use for which the power of con-
demnation is appropriate. 90 The legislature could remove these ob-
stacles. If it wished to facilitate diversions that generally increase
economic utility,9 1 the General Assembly could specify that emi-
nent domain is available to all entities seeking to initiate in-
terbasin diversions.92
The final option the General Assembly could consider to facili-
tate the use of interbasin transfers is specifically protecting the
area of origin from the adverse consequences of transfer. The pri-
mary concern of the exporting region is its interest in its ability to
support future growth requiring more extensive use of water. A
number of western states have experience with statutorily protect-
ing the area of origin;93 California is the leading example.94 Various
mechanisms to protect the exporting region can be implemented,
including local preference in time of shortage, appropriation of
funds to support water-deljendent development projects in the
area of origin, and stringent anti-waste provisions governing use in
the importing region. The need to consider area of origin protec-
tion as part and parcel of the legislative response to the issue of
interbasin transfers is compelling. If the area of origin is to win
these concessions, it must do so prior to transfer, because once the
importing region begins to rely on the water, recapturing the water
will be impossible. Additionally, after transfer, little political moti-
vation will remain for representatives of the importing region to
support development projects in the area of origin that necessarily
create additional competition for scarce supplies of water in the
90. See I. LEvEY, CONDEMNATION iN U.S.A. § 14, at 167-68 (1969).
91. By making a more valuable use of the water, the importing condemnor would increase
economic utility.
92. This grant of power would include private entrepreneurs. In the West, such a grant is
a commonplace method of providing appropriators a means of bringing water to their land.
See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1007 (West 1971). Giving the power of condemnation to a
private enterprise, however, is not free from difficulty. The possibility of successive condem-
nations by competing would-be users demonstrates the need for regulation.
93. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-45-118(1)(b)(IV) (1973) (protecting certain waters
from diversion); TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 49-d (1962, amended 1966) (basins of origin pro-
tected to extent of needs for next 50 years).
94. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 11100-11925 (West 1971) (Central Valley Project Act,
one provision of which was protecting the watershed where the water originated). See gener-
ally Robie & Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes-The California Experience, 15 IDAHo L.
Rav. 419 (1979).
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future.
The precise character of possible legislation that facilitates di-
version varies, but one possibility is a legislative permit system.
One commentator recently undertook a thorough examination of
eastern water diversion permit statutes in the context of advocat-
ing that his home state of Missouri enact such a permit system.9 5
Unlike Virginia, increased competition for water in Missouri is due
primarily to increased water-dependent economic activity in neigh-
boring upstream states.96 Nevertheless, the general discussion of
permit systems, in the context of Missouri law, highlights the criti-
cal issues to be addressed by any comprehensive regulatory
scheme.9 7 Foremost among these issues are overall allocative pol-
icy, 8 the conflict between security of current users and interests of
future users,99 and protecting in-stream uses. 100 The benefits of a
permit system lie in its ability to centralize the planning process in
a single state agency or adjudicatory body. The drawbacks to a
permit system, as with any administrative process, include poten-
tial insularity, low level visibility of decisionmaking, and burden-
some delay and red tape.
INTERSTATE TRANSFERS OF WATER
Interstate interbasin diversions of water are relatively uncom-
mon, and when proposed, usually generate intense controversy. In
the East and West alike, states jealously guard their perceived nat-
ural advantage and oppose transfers that will reduce their water
supply.101 Absent payment of a substantial purchase price, out-of-
state diversions offer relatively little benefit to the originating
state. Moreover, rarely does a readily discernable constituency in
95. Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for Missouri?, 47 Mo. L.
Rv. 429 (1982).
96. Id. at 431-32.
97. Professor Davis opts for a statutory permit scheme. Id. at 431, 470. He acknowledges,
however, that other statutory mechanisms, such as mandatory reporting or explicit statutory
authority allowing courts to enjoin diversions, might aptly address some diversion issues. Id.
at 465-68.
98. Id. at 450-56.
99. Id. at 456-59.
100. Id. at 459-60.
101. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982); Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
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the exporting state favor the transfer.102 Occasionally, as appears
to be the case regarding proposals for a North Carolina to Virginia
diversion, a state of origin may attempt to bargain for some advan-
tage in return for its support of a diversion. North Carolina appar-
ently is seeking to reduce Virginia's liquid effluent discharges to
benefit North Carolinians located downstream. 03 For purposes of
discussion, however, this Article proceeds on the premise that in-
terstate transfer proposals are supported by the destination state
and resisted by the other states involved. The diversion issue will
be simplified to consider only disputes between the origin state
and destination state 0 ' involving either a river as to which both
states are riparian, or a transfer from one intrastate basin in the
origin state to another intrastate basin in the destination state.
Federal Apportionment of Waters
Interstate disputes over control and exploitation of the nation's
natural resources commend themselves to resolution under federal
law. The United States Constitution expressly confers on the
United States Supreme Court original jurisdiction over interstate
disputes,10 5 and gives Congress authority to regulate interstate
commerce.10 6 The Supremacy Clause requires that federal law con-
trols when in conffict with state- laws. 0 Thus, either a Supreme
102. In some instances, exporting states favor transfers. For example, South Dakota re-
cently entered into an agreement to sell water for export to a coal slurry operation. In that
case, the amount of water involved was relatively small, and cash and collateral benefits to
South Dakota were quite high. See W. Witten, Water Development for Coal Pipelines: The
ETSI Story (June 8, 1982) (paper presented to Conference on New Sources of Water for
Energy Development and Growth: Interbasin Transfers, Natural Resources Law Center,
University of Colorado School of Law). It is noteworthy that downstream states such as
Nebraska oppose this diversion out of the Missouri River Basin. See N. Thorson, A Down-
stream Perspective on South Dakota's Purported Sale of Water to ETSI (June 8, 1982)
(paper presented to Conference on New Sources of Water for Energy Development and
Growth: Interbasin Transfers, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School
of Law)..
103. Newport News Daily Press, Aug. 19, 1982, at A-27, col. 4.
104. The full range of problems of multi-state waters, such as the Great Lakes, are too
complex for present consideration. Issues involving individuals rather than states as dispu-
tants are likewise omitted.
105. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
106. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
107. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Court ruling or a congressional enactment regarding an interstate
dispute about water transfers would preempt any state or local leg-
islative or regulatory efforts.
Involvement of these two branches of the federal government in
past instances of competing claims to interstate waters confirms
the doctrine of federal supremacy. The Supreme Court has exer-
cised jurisdiction in interstate water disputes and apportioned the
waters between the states.110 Similarly, Congress on occasion has
intervened in water disputes and apportioned the waters of an in-
terstate river among states situated along the river.109 Congress,
however, has never enacted a general rule governing all interstate
waters. Similarly, the Supreme Court decisions to date, while hav-
ing some precedential value, are not dispositive of future cases.11
A careful examination of the Supreme Court's pronouncements re-
garding apportionment, however, will help determine whether a
proposed interstate water diversion into Virginia can be resisted
successfully by North Carolina, the state of origin.
Litigation involving an interstate interbasin diversion probably
will result in state versus state litigation, although few suits involv-
ing conflicting claims of individuals located in different states to
the use of a single river have reached the Supreme Court.1 In
adjudicating these cases, however, the Court prefaces its decisions
by referring to its power to apportion water between states. For
example, in one case Justice Holmes pronounced that the decision
is "subject to such rights as the lower State might be decided by
this court to have .. ,. . Thus, obtaining a definitive ruling on
the right to divert water requires that the Court ultimately hear
and decide a case between the states involved. This requirement
promotes judicial efficiency. In litigation between states the Court
takes the view that each state, through prosecution of its sovereign
108. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachu-
setts, 282 U.S. 660 (1930).
109. See, e.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. 617 (1976); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963). Discussion of interstate compacts, although highly relevant to inter-
state water allocations, is beyond the scope of the hypothetical under discussion, because
the competing states are presumed to disagree on an allocation.
110. See infra.notes 114-37 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (1911).
112. Id. at 486.
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interest, "must be deemed to represent all its citizens." '113 The
Court thereby eliminates the need for separate dispute resolution
for each individual claimant.
In interstate water litigation, the Supreme Court applies the
doctrine of equitable apportionment to resolve disputes."' An-
nounced in 1907, the doctrine first received application in a dis-
pute involving two prior appropriation states, but the doctrine sub-
sequently has been applied to disputes involving two riparian
states.11 5 At least initially, the Court viewed its role in resolving
interstate water disputes as being born of necessity. The Court
stated that "if the two states were absolutely independent nations
[the water dispute] would be settled by treaty or by force. Neither
of those ways being practicable, it must be decided by decision of
this Court."1116
The principles of decision in these cases are amorphous.17 In its
first application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment, the
Court was impressed by the importance of water use in the up-
stream state and unimpressed by the detriment to downstream
113. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 173 (1930). The same logic has prevailed in equi-
table apportionment cases. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 508-09 (1932).
114. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
115. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
Justice Marshall outlined the alternate legal doctrines in a recent equitable apportion-
ment case:
The prior appropriation doctrine and the riparian doctrine are the two basic,
doctrines governing the rights to the use of water. Under the prior appropria-
tion doctrine, recognized in most of the western states, water rights are ac-
quired by diverting water and applying it for a beneficial purpose. A distinctive
feature of the prior appropriation doctrine is the rule of priority, under which
the relative rights of water users are ranked in the order of their seniority.
Under the riparian doctrine, recognized primarily in the eastern, midwestern
and southern states, the owner of land contiguous to a watercourse is entitled
to have the stream flow by and through his land undiminished in quantity and
unpolluted in quality, except that any riparian proprietor may make whatever
use of the water that is reasonable with respect to the needs of other
appropriators.
Colorado v. New Mexico, 51 U.S.L.W. 4045, 4046 n.4 (Dec. 13, 1982).
116. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 98.
117. For a noteworthy criticism of the Supreme Court and its use of the doctrine, see
Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 48-51 (1966). Dean Meyers contends that
congressional apportionment of interstate water is preferable to judicial apportionment. A
major factor in his analysis is the absence of clear principles to guide judicial distribution.
Id. at 50-51. But see infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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users. Justice Brewer wrote, "it would seem that equality of right
and equity beween two states forbids any interference with present
withdrawal of water in Colorado [the upstream state] . . .,.
The opinion cautioned, however, that the doctrine was flexible,
noting that "it is obvious that if the depletion of the waters of the
river by Colorado continues to increase there will come a time
when Kansas [the downstream state] may justly say that there is
no longer an equitable division of benefits, and may rightfully call
for relief against the action of Colorado ....
In later cases the court altered the approach somewhat by
awarding quantified amounts of water to the disputant states.
120
Nevertheless, the precise content of the doctrine of equitable ap-
portionment remained vague. In New Jersey v. New York, 21 a ma-
jor case decided in 1931 involving diversion for the benefit of New
York City, Justice Holmes wrote:
A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a ne-
cessity of life that must be rationed among those who have
power over it. New York has the physical power to cut off all the
water within its jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such
power to the destruction of the interest of the lower States could
not be tolerated. And on the other hand equally little could New
Jersey be permitted to require New York to give up its power
altogether in order that the river might come down to it undi-
minished. Both States have real and substantial interests in the
River that must be reconciled as best they may. The different
traditions and practices in different parts of the country may
lead to varying results but the effort always is to secure an equi-
table apportionment without quibbling over formulas. 2'
In its most recent equitable apportionment case, Colorado v.
New Mexico, 123 the Supreme Court offered some guidance on fac-
tors and proof that will influence its judgment. In rejecting the
118. 206 U.S. at 114.
119. Id. at 117.
120. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 496 (1922). In a dispute between two
states employing the doctrine of prior appropriation, the Court viewed as relevant the rela-
tive priorities in time of competing appropriators located in the two states. Id. at 470-71.
121. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
122. Id. at 342-43.
123. 51 U.S.L.W. 4045 (Dec. 13, 1982).
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findings of the Special Master 24 as insufficiently detailed to permit
the Court to review the application of principle to fact, 25 the
Court rejected state law regarding prior appropriation as control-
ling, even if both the competing states had adopted the prior ap-
propriation doctrine.' 2 The Court applied federal law and indi-
cated that conservation efforts of both states are relevant,
including efforts by the state that inevitably risked losing water
due to the apportionment. 27 Further, the Court stated that "it is
proper to weigh the harms and benefits to competing states.' 28 As.
between existing users and potential users, the Court observed that
"the equities supporting existing economies will usually be compel-
ling. The harm that may result from disrupting established uses is
typically certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits
from a proposed diversion may be speculative.' 129 Perhaps most
important to present purposes, however, the majority specified in a
footnote that "a state seeking to prevent or enjoin a diversion by
another state bears the burden of proving that the diversion will
cause it 'real or substantial injury or damage,' ,,0 a burden that
must be sustained by "clear and convincing evidence."' 3 ' The
Court, then, clearly favors protecting existing users over potential
users.3 2 Additionally, the Court apparently favors those states that
seek to divert and use water over states opposed to the transfer. 33
Returning to potential interstate water transfers into Virginia, a
124. The Court appointed Ewing T. Kerr, Senior Judge of the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming, to examine the evidence and submit a report to the
Court. Id. at 4046.
125. Id. at 4048.
126. Id. at 4047.
127. Id. at 4049. New Mexico claimed it had wholly appropriated the flow of the river. Id.
at 4047. The Court required the Special Master to determine how much water could be
saved by conservation measures in New Mexico, thereby making such water available for
use in Colorado. Id. at 4049.
128. Id. at 4047.
129. Id. at 4048.
130. Id. at 4048 n.13.
131. Id. at 4048.
132. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Powell, concurred in the result. Her opinion is
even more favorable to existing water users than that of the majority. Id. at 4049-50.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. The opinions probably overstate predisposition toward either state. Talk of identi-
fied factors and fixed burdens of proof is antithetical to the spirit of the doctrine which, in
the past, had stressed equitable sharing.
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few general observations about the application of equitable appor-
tionment are possible. First, no single state may exercise exclusive
control over an interstate river."M Thus, the mere fact that another
state, such as North Carolina, opposes the transfer will be of little
consequence to the Supreme Court in deciding whether Virginia
may withdraw water from the river for use out of the basin of ori-
gin. That no state has an exclusive right to the water is true re-
gardless of the physical relationship of the states to the water or to
the point of diversion. 135 Similarly, no .state has an exclusive right
to the water even if, once transported to the importing basin, the
water never flows back into the origin state.' Most important, the
state opposing the transfer has the burden of proving that eco-
nomic harm will be sufffered by actual or potential users as a di-
rect result of the transfer. 13 7 These general precepts about equita-
ble apportionment indicate that no per se rule of non-diversion
would prevent a Virginia importation plan. In fact, as long as Vir-
ginia is not seeking to obtain a disproportionate share of the water,
its claim of right to use the water is likely to win Supreme Court
approval.
A final cautionary note is appropriate. If the 'proposal involves
transfer from a watercourse to which Virginia is not riparian, equi-
table apportionment may not apply. All prior cases of equitable
apportionment have adjudicated disputes among co-riparian
states. Indeed, Justice Holmes, the author of several leading appor-
tionment decisions, stated in Hudson County Water Co. v. Mc-
Carter138 that the doctrine is inapposite to cases involving inter-
134. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
135. The upstream/downstream positioning is shown to be of no consequence. The Court
has inherent power to apportion the stream in favor of either disputant. See supra notes
109-20 and accompanying text.
136. If, for example, the Potomac River were to be the source for a diversion, the diver-
sion might occur near its headwaters in West Virginia. The fact that lower parts of the river
in West Virginia and its entire flow along the Maryland border are adversely affected will
not give either West Virginia or Maryland a veto power over the proposal in equitable ap-
portionment litigation. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922) (allowing
upper riparian state to divert river water to a basin that did not drain into lower riparian
state). Cf. Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 487 (1911) (assuming in an interstate apportion-
ment dispute "the same rights to be acquired from outside the State that could be acquired
from within.").
137. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4048 n.13.
138. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
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state diversion of an intrastate stream. In upholding New Jersey's
right to prevent such a diversion, he stated:
[Flew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and inde-
pendent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a
State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substan-
tially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the
guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of
turning them to a more perfect use.1"9
Although the case in which that language appeared is now of
doubtful constitutional validity,140 the logic concerning the princi-
139. Id. at 356. The passage was penned in response to a challenge by a private riparian
who sought to divert the water out of state for use. The remainder of the passage is as
follows:
This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more
pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the
private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots. Whether it be said that such an interest justifies the cutting down by
statute, without compensation, in the exercise of the police power, of what oth-
erwise would be private rights of property, or that apart from statute those
rights do not go to the height of what the defendant seeks to do, the result is
the same. But we agree with the New Jersey courts, and think it quite beyond
any rational view of riparian rights that an agreement, of no matter what pri-
vate owners, could sanction the diversion of an important stream outside the
boundaries of the State in which it flows. The private right to appropriate is
subject not only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that
it may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public wel-
fare and health.
We are of opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the State to in-
sist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not
dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation
as to future needs. The legal conception of the necessary is apt to be confined
to somewhat rudimentary wants, and there are benefits frora a great river that
might escape a lawyer's view. But the State is not required to submit even to
an aesthetic analysis. Any analysis may be inadequate. It finds itself in posses-
sion of what all admit to be a great public good, and what it has it may keep
and give no one a reason for its will.
Id. at 356-57.
140. The constitutionality of prohibiting water export is now doubtful. See Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes
150-60. In Sporhase, a Nebraska state court invoked Nebraska law to enjoin the export of
ground water. The defendant owned land which straddled the Nebraska-Colorado boundary
line. A well on the Nebraska portion of the tract supplied water to the entire tract. The
Nebraska court based its injunction on a law which forbade export of ground water to a
state, like Colorado, that did not provide for reciprocity in the export and use of ground
water.
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ple of apportionment survives. No obvious basis exists on which to
allocate to a nonriparian state water from another state's stream.
Accordingly, whether the judicial doctrine of equitable apportion-
ment will require a state to allow interstate diversion of an intra-
state river is uncertain. If a federal basis exists that would permit
such transfers, its genesis must lie in considerations that are
broader than the Supreme Court's institutional role as referee of
interstate disputes.
The Dormant Commerce Clause
In discussing interstate interbasin water diversion into Virginia,
the presumption was that the state of origin would oppose the
transfer. 4 1 Indeed, a transferor state might view the transfer not
only as an exportation of water but also as an exportation of op-
portunities for economic development that depend on water.142
When the water may be equitably apportioned is an appropriate
subject for congressional legislation and, as previously discussed,
opposition to the transfer by the state of origin may be inconse-
quential. 143 For waters that are neither subject to equitable appor-
tionment 4 4 nor apportioned by appropriate federal legislation,
45
The Supreme Court held that the Nebraska ground water reciprocity provision violated
the commerce clause. Id. at 3467. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that ground
water is an article of interstate commerce. Id. at 3463. The Nebraska law imposed an ex-
plicit barrier to commerce in a field of regulation not surrendered by Congress to the states.
Id. at 3465-66.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, said in dissent that ground water is not an
article of interstate commerce. Id. at 3468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, the mere fact that totally prohibiting exports is constitutionally impermissi-
ble does not mean that a nonriparian state must be apportioned some water from an out-of-
state source.
141. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
142. See Abrams, Setting Regional Policy on Diverting Great Lakes Water to the Arid
West: Scaling Down Two Myths, 2 WAYNE LAWvER 6 (1982). Even if the only current eco-
nomic effect of preventing transfer is to impede development in the transferee state, the
position of the transferor state in the race for future development is at least marginally
better.
143. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
145. The power of Congress in this regard has been largely unexercised. See supra note
109 and accompanying text. In other natural resource contexts, such as energy, Congress has
intervened and limited states from regulating energy production in a way that fails, to foster
the interstate market for electric power. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
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Virginia must employ some other doctrine to overcome anticipated
resistance from the state of origin.
Apart from judicially mandated apportionment, the major legal
sword available against state law forbidding out-of-basin, out-of-
state water exportation is the dormant commerce clause.1" In re-
cent years state laws banning exportation of natural resources have
fared poorly when subjected to constitutional attack. Significant
examples include Oklahoma's attempt to restrict interstate sales of
naturally seined minnows,4 New Hampshire's attempt to reserve
locally generated low cost hydropower for its own citizens, 1 4 and
Nebraska's attempt to restrict ground water exportation.1 49 In all
of these cases the Supreme Court invalidated the protective state
legislation because it interfered with the national interest in the
free flow of natural resources among the states.
The Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma'" laid to rest the fiction that
state ownership of natural resources could insulate from constitu-
tional review state laws restricting interstate commerce. The
fiction operated by saying that the person who reduced the natural
resource to possession received only those rights that the state, as
former owner, chose to transfer. If a state conditioned its relin-
quishment of ownership on non-export of the resource, the re-
source could not become an article of interstate commerce; conse-
quently, the commerce clause was wholly inapposite. 151 Freed of
this fiction, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that
"the general rule we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for
16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 2601 (Supp. IV 1980). See also FERC v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126
(1982) (upholding Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act against constitutional attack). Cf.
American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3287 (Oct. 12, 1982) (evaluating FERC regulations on cogeneration and small
power production).
146. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The clause is described as dormant in this context
because the idea of nationhood it promotes is self-executing and does not rely on affirmative
action by Congress.
147. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
148. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S. Ct. 1096 (1982).
149. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 5. Ct. 3456 (1982). See supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
150. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
151. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896). The decision in Geer served as the
basis for decision in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). See supra
notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause,
the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of
wild animals underlying the 19th Century legal fiction of state
ownership. 152
The Court then announced a three part test of constitutionality.
First, the Court considers whether the statute is overtly discrimi-
natory against interstate commerce. Overtly discriminatory stat-
utes receive strict scrutiny on review. Second, if the statute is not
overtly discriminatory, the Court examines the statutory purpose.
Finally, if the statute serves a legitimate purpose, the Court deter-
mines whether a less restrictive alternative exists for achieving the
purpose.153 Finding the Oklahoma statute overtly discriminatory,
the Court concluded that the State's defense of the statute did not
satisfy the strict scrutiny given to discriminatory legislation.1
54
The Nebraska statute banning ground water exportation155 that
was the subject of the decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel
Douglas116 illustrates the type of statute that Virginia might en-
counter if it attempts to import water from a river located wholly
in another state. Nebraska passed the statute by relying on the
previously mentioned Hudson County Water case,1 57 which sus-
tained New Jersey's right to prevent interstate transport of water
from an intrastate stream. The Hudson County Water decision
152. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979).
153. The formulation is as follows:
[W]e must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly
with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against
interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the
statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative
means could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against
interstate commerce. The burden to show discrimination rests on the party
challenging the validity of the statute, but when discrimination against com-
merce ... is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in
terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake.
Id. at 336 (quoting Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353
(1977)).
154. Id. at 337-38.
155. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
156. 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982). See States ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 705, 305
N.W.2d 614, 618 (1981).
157. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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had relied upon the concept of state ownership, subsequently dis-
credited by Hughes v. Oklahoma.1 58 Subjecting the Nebraska stat-
ute to the commerce clause test set out in Hughes, ' the Court in
Sporhase found the statute constitutionally infirm.160
The fact-specific tenor of the Sporhase opinion suggests further
analysis might be instructive. The disputed statutory provision in
Sporhase provided:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any
other entity intending to withdraw ground water from any well
or pit located in the State of Nebraska and transport it for use
in an adjoining state shall apply to the Department of Water
Resources for a permit to do so. If the Director of Water
Resources finds that the withdrawal of the ground water re-
quested is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and
use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the
public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the state in which the
water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and
transport ground water from that state for use in the State of
Nebraska.'6 1
Nebraska claimed that the purpose of the statute was conservation
and preservation of the resource. The majority acknowledged the
legitimacy of the purpose and noted that Nebraska's genuine ef-
forts to conserve ground water resources were amply demonstrated
by other aspects of the statewide ground water management
scheme.162 Additionally, Nebraska water officials had designated
the specific land and ground water basin involved in Sporhase as
an area of inadequate ground water supply. Referring to this desig-
nation, the Supreme Court stated, "[A]t least in the area in which
appellants' Nebraska tract is located, the first three standards of
section 46-613.01 may well be no more strict in application than
the limitations upon intrastate transfers . . " Thus, although
the Nebraska statute was unconstitutional, the suggestion is that a
statute that is part of a statewide conservation scheme and that
158. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 153.
160. The decision was seven to two, with Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissenting.
161. See supra note 155.
162. 102 S. Ct. at 3463-64.
163. Id. at 3464.
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burdens intrastate as well as interstate diversion will be more fa-
vorably received by the Court than a statute that does not serve a
broad conservation purpose or that prohibits only interstate
diversion.
The constitutionally infirm provision of the statute was the reci-
procity requirement which "operate[d] as an explicit barrier to
commerce between the two States."164 Finding that the reciprocity
requirement was not drawn as narrowly as possible in furtherance
of the conservation purpose, the Court invalidated the entire stat-
ute. In dicta, however, the Court observed that even statutes
prohibiting water exports altogether might survive scrutiny if the
state made a strong enough showing that the means chosen were
necessary to achieve a critical end such as providing water to state
residents.1 6 5
Prohibitions on water exports in the East are inherently less
compelling than those that exist in the West. The Court evaluates
statutes prohibiting water exportation by standards of strictest ne-
cessity, and water in the East is relatively plentiful, even in times
of shortage. The showing that Sporhase requires to save a statute
prohibiting water exports arguably cannot be made by an eastern
state. The prohibition standing alone would not outweigh the
countervailing value of uninhibited interstate commerce. If linked
to rigidly enforced intrastate bans on diversions and in-state water
conservation practices, however, an eastern statute is more likely
to survive. Whether the saving features would save the statute de-
spite the inherently less compelling state interest is unclear. The
Court will probably conclude that problems of local water shortage
existing in the East need not be remedied by a regulatory regime
that burdens interstate movement of a valuable resource.
Although prohibitions on water exportation by an eastern state
might be unconstitutional, a state may enact other measures that,
while not overtly discriminatory against interstate commerce,
nonetheless discourage out-of-state water transfers. One option is
to raise the cost of interbasin transfers by imposing a substantial
164. Id. at 3465.
165. Id. See also Clyde, State Prohibitions on the Interstate Exportation of Scarce
Water Resources, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 529 (1982) (arguing export bans to be valid, but
written prior to Sporhase).
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water severance tax on all water users outside of the basin of ori-
gin. If the majority of intrastate users are also intrabasin users, the
tax will affect interstate users to a greater extent than intrastate
users. This disproportionate effect does not offend the commerce
clause if the statute was enacted for a legitimate purpose, such as
raising revenue, as long as it treats intrastate and interstate out-of-
basin diversions equally.""6 Other legislation inhibiting interbasin
diversion includes imposing strict liability on diverters for present
or future damage sustained by downstream riparians, and estab-
lishing a user priority system which, in times of shortage, prefers
in-basin users over out-of-basin users. The strict liability statute
would add an uncertain expense factor to the interbasin diversion.
The priority statute would render water availability uncertain,
threatening interruption at precisely the worst times-during peri-
ods of drought. These statutes all regulate evenhandedly intrastate
and interstate commerce. They are not facially discriminatory, and
do not have as their purpose frustration of interstate commerce.
The constitutional inquiry, under a standard less exacting than
strict scrutiny, will be whether the legislation supports legitimate
local interests in a way that does not unduly burden interstate
commerce. 167 Although the constitutional outcome will depend on
the facts of each case, the Supreme Court will be less likely to act
intrusively when the impact on interstate commerce is not overtly
discriminatory.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of interbasin transfers as a means of augmenting
local water supply in the East began by discussing physical aspects
of water supply and transfer in an effort to develop concepts of
water shortage and surplus. Presently, water shortages in the East
occur primarily during times of low rainfall; however, there is a
need for a secure water supply under all conditions and that need
is increasing as population and economic activity increases. At
some point, rapidly growing regions such as Tidewater Virginia
must augment supply, and importing water from another basin is
166. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1981) (sustaining
large coal severance tax despite fact that 95% of the coal moved in interstate commerce).
167. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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an attractive alternative. In an intrastate context, interbasin trans-
fer is a promising option because the importing region will have
greater political strength than the less developed exporting region.
Additionally, mixed impacts on the exporting basin are likely to
fragment opposition from that region. Even if political and eco-
nomic arguments favor interbasin transfers, however, legal doc-
trines are equally important. Throughout the East, the common
law doctrine of riparianism, and the consequent right to reasonable
use, prevails. Diversion of water is not always considered a reason-
able use. Intrastate interbasin transfers would be facilitated by
favorable legislation overruling or clarifying the common law.
Interstate transfers are more complex. Congress enjoys, but sel-
dom exercises, the power to define and allocate water use rights
among competing states. This hesitancy is probably attributable to
the fact that interstate diversions are far more likely to engender
politically balanced, state against state opposition. Unlike intra-
state transfers, where the voice of the area of destination domi-
nates the process, interstate diversion will be opposed by the state
of origin which fears that water export will limit future economic
growth. Rough parity of power exists between rival states, a parity
that has no parallel in the intrastate context.
The major legal issue regarding interstate transfers is whether
the state of origin may prohibit transfers. Judicially mandated eq-
uitable apportionment of water will require some sharing of the
water to which both states are riparian. Additionally, the dormant
commerce clause will be an obstacle to states explicitly banning all
interstate exports. States of origin, however, still enjoy substantial
latitude to enact various statutes that in their operation discourage
interbasin transfers. These statutes will be subject to case-by-case
review to determine whether they unduly burden interstate com-
merce. If the statutes implement a comprehensive water resource
management plan that restricts in-state activities as well as inter-
state transfers, these statutes probably will pass constitutional
muster.
Intrastate interbasin water transfers are a realistic alternative
for areas in the East experiencing episodic water shortages, as well
as for areas of chronic shortage. The common law doctrines gov-
erning water resources are malleable enough to accomodate in-
terbasin transfers. These same legal doctrines, bolstered by appro-
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priate legislation, can encourage interbasin transfers. Before
concluding that interbasin transfers should be encouraged, how-
ever, policy makers should conduct a searching inquiry into the
general desirability of interbasin transfers. A series of project-spe-
cific decisions transfering water to another basin, each of which is
commercially supported in its own right, may mask a larger socie-
tal price that is exacted by the reliance on large-scale, centralized
projects. 1 8
168. See generally K. WrrrFOGEL, ORmINTAL DasPoTIsM (1957) (noting the loss of individ-
ual freedom in Oriental cultures that attends the societal organization required to undertake
major water projects). The experience with large-scale water projects in the American West
has resulted in some appreciable loss of individual freedom. Cf. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (approving voting scheme that fa-
vored holders of valuable lands to exclusion of mere residents and lessees, resulting in a few
large landholding corporations having 85% of the voting power); Note, Orr v. Kneip: Defin-
ing the Limits of "One Person, One Vote" In the Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict, 25 S.D.L.
Rev. 597 (1980) (voting inequity).
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